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The word ‘genius’ is often associated with the idea that artistic crea-
tivity is entirely a matter of an involuntary sort of inspiration visited
upon the individual artist.1My aim in referring to cinematic genius is
not, however, to defend that dubious thesis, but to direct attention to
the remarkable artistic achievements that some film-makers, working
individually or in collaborative teams, have managed to bring about
in their intentional and often painstaking creation of cinematic
works. Genius, as I understand it, is the exceptional ability to do
something difficult, such as the intentional making of an innovative
and valuable work of art. My central claim in what follows is that
our longstanding and legitimate interest in manifestations of this
kind of skill has important implications for a number of interrelated
issues in the philosophy of art, and in particular, for some of the ques-
tions taken up in the ever-expanding literature on the ontology of
works of art.
I begin by evoking some of the central questions in the ontology of
art and recommend one approach to their solution. In the second
section of the paper I discuss aspects of a particular case in some
detail, namely, Mira Nair’s (2004) cinematic adaptation of William
Makepeace Thackeray’s (1848) Vanity Fair. One upshot of this dis-
cussion is that when we take into account what it means to appreciate
a cinematic adaptation as such, we discover additional support for the
recommended approach to the ontological questions. In the final
section of the paper, I examine some implications for our understand-
ing of the nature of cinematic works and conclude with remarks on
the distinction between multiple and singular art forms.
1 For background, seemy ‘Poincare’s “Delicate Sieve”: OnCreativity in
the Arts’, in Krausz, Michael, Dutton, Denis and Bardsley, Karen (eds.),
The Idea of Creativity (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 129–146; ‘Creativity’, in
Borchert, Donald (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition
(Detroit: Macmilland, 2006), Vol. 2, 688–691, and Art and Intention: A
Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), chapter 2.
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IThemost basic and central question towhich contributions in the on-
tology of art address themselves concerns what kinds of things works
of art are.2 It is asked, then, whether all sorts of works are plausibly
thought to belong to a single overarching category of entities, and if
so, what category that is. Related questions include how particular
works are to be individuated, and under what conditions they may
be created and destroyed.
With regard to the first question, a central dispute concerns the dis-
tinction between multiple and singular works, the thought being that
if both of these categories are applicable to the arts, monism about the
ontology of art is false. And indeed many philosophers have argued
that while some works are ‘multiple’ in the sense of having, at least
in principle, more than one instance, another very basic category of
works is made up of those that are in some sense singular or non-
iterable.3
The latter assumption has been contested. For example, in his
fairly brief, enigmatic yet highly influential essay of 1936, Walter
Benjamin contrasted the cinematic work’s mechanical reproducibil-
ity to what he called the ‘auratic’ status and function of works such
as Leonardo’s Mona Lisa.4 According to Benjamin, the essential
genius of the cinema as a medium and art form is its disruption of
the traditional, quasi-religious ideology of the uniqueness or indivi-
duality of the work of art. Other philosophers, such as C. I. Lewis
2 For instructive surveys, see Currie, Gregory, ‘Art works, ontology of’,
in Craig Edward (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London:
Routledge, 1998, 2010); retrieved April 08, 2011 from http://www.rep.rout
ledge.com/article/M012; Davies, Stephen ‘Ontology of Art’, in Levinson
Jerrold (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 155–180; Gracyk, Theodore, ‘Ontological
Contextualism’, in Davies, Stephen, et al. (eds), A Companion to
Aesthetics, 2nd edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 449–453,
and Thomasson Amie, ‘The Ontology of Art’, in Kivy Peter (ed.), The
Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 78–92.
3 Davies, Stephen, ‘Ontology of Art’, in Levinson, Jerrold (ed.), The
Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
155–180.
4 See Benjamin, Walter, ‘L’œuvre d’art à l’époque de sa reproduction
mécanisée’, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 5 (1936), 40–66; ‘Das
Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit’, in
Tiedemann, Rolf and Schweppenhäuser, Hermann (eds.), Gesammelte
Schriften, Vol. I:2 (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1980), 431–469.
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in 1946, Andrew Paul Ushenko in 1953, and Peter Strawson in 1958,
have reasoned that as a matter of metaphysical if not technological
possibility, all of the artefacts associated with works of art, and
perhaps the works themselves, could have multiple instantiations.5
If they are right, then the ‘auratic’ belief in a work’s individuality
would be illusory in all art forms, and not just the cinema. The
thesis that at least some works are particulars as opposed to types or
universals still has its adherents, however. For example, in a paper
on the relations between art and technology, Anthony O’Hear
defends what he calls the ‘singularity thesis’, which is the idea that
works of art, or at least those ‘of distinction’, are necessarily individ-
ual and unique.6
The debate between the advocates of contrasting ‘monist’ and
other views on the work of art continues in the contemporary litera-
ture. I return to this topic below, but shall first recommend a very
general approach to the more general question of the nature of
works of art.7
Various philosophers who have commented on the problematic
nature of topics in the ontology of art have suggested that at least
part of the problem resides in a ‘process/product’ ambiguity inherent
in the term ‘work’ (and related terms in other languages, such as
Werk, œuvre, opus, etc.).8 If this is right, then a first attempt at expli-
cating a concept of works can adopt any one of three basic strategies:
eliminate the product and retain the process; eliminate the process
and retain the product; and finally, retain both process and
5 Lewis, C. I., An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle,
IL: Open Court, 1946), Ushenko, Andrew Paul, Dynamics of Art
(Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1953), 21–25, Strawson
Peter F., Individuals (London: Methuen, University Paperbacks, 1959),
231, n.1; see also his ‘Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art’, in Freedom
and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Metheun, 1974), 178–88, at
p. 183: ‘There is no reason for regarding the members of some classes of
works of art as essentially particulars, rather than types. All works of art, cer-
tainly, are individuals; but all are equally types and not particulars’.
6 O’Hear, Anthony, ‘Art and Technology: An Old Tension’, in
Fellows, Roger (ed.), Philosophy and Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 143–158; reprinted in The Landscapes of
Humanity: Art, Culture and Society (Exeter: Imprint, 2008), 126–142.
7 For a survey, see my ‘History of the Ontology of Art’, Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011); http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art-
ontology-history/
8 A fairly early, and generally overlooked example is Boas, George, A
Primer for Critics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937).
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product, for example, by understanding the concept of the work as
somehow covering their relation.
The first of these options has been attempted by various philoso-
phers. Robin Collingwood is an early example, at least if we take lit-
erally those formulations in which he clearly states that thework is the
artist’s ‘activity’.9 This line of thought has the disadvantage of ne-
glecting the evidence that artistic creation is not always a process
undertaken with no product in view. In many cases, the artist’s
activity is clearly intended to eventuate in some finished, perceptible
item that can be put on display and attended to, and this sort of prac-
tice is central to the worlds of art. To say that the work is the activity
alone and in nowise the product of this activity is implausible because
it simply denies this fact.
The second option amounts to thinking of works as finished pro-
ducts only. St Thomas Aquinas can be interpreted as espousing
this option when he contends that art ‘does not require the artist to
proceed well, but to make a good work’ because ‘the good of art is
considered not in the artist himself, but in the product [opus]’.10
This position is sometimes promoted as the ordinary or common
sense view. Proposals that diverge from it are labeled ‘revisionist’
and attacked as inconsistent with ordinary usage. And indeed we
are apt to say that the Mona Lisa is to be glimpsed inside the thick
glass case in which it is housed at the Louvre. Do not such utterances
refer to the work of art as a discrete material object having a determi-
nate spatio-temporal location, which is certainly not the case with the
process of Da Vinci’s making of the picture, which apparently took
place over twelve years? The second type of explication of ‘work’,
then, has the apparent advantage of setting aside the intangible and
fleeting thoughts and actions of the artist so as to seize upon the
final product, which remains to be identified as the work of art itself.
A first problem with this position, however, is that if some works
are happenings or performances (which arguably belong to the cat-
egory of events), then not all works of art are reducible to, or are
even partly constituted by a product, if by this is meant a particular
physical or abstract artifact. It would indeed be a stretch to classify
the action undertaken by a performance artist, such as Chris
9 Collingwood, Robin George, The Principles of Art (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1938), 281–282.
10 Aquinas, St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae q. 57 a. 5. Cited by
Tatarkiewicz, Władysław in History of Aesthetics, II: Medieval Aesthetics
(TheHague:Mouton, 1970), 261. The context is an argument for the neces-
sity of prudence to virtue and a good life, but not to goodness in art.
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Burden’s having himself shot in the arm, as a ‘product’. A second
problem with this general approach to the ontology of works is that
it is hard to square with our demonstrable and justifiable interest in
the artistic artefact, taken not as a detachable product, but as the
manifestation and upshot of the artist’s purposeful activities and abil-
ities, reference to which is necessary to the correct classification of the
item. The latter point is made by Kant in the Kritik der Urteilskraft
when he distinguishes between works and natural items such as hon-
eycombs. Kant claims that the former, unlike the latter, involve the
exercise of freedom, and he adds immediately that by this he means
that a work, unlike the honeycomb, arises ‘durch eine Willkür’:
‘through a capacity for choice that grounds its actions in reason’.11
It should be noted, however, that Kant did not explicitly square off
against the above-cited thesis advanced by Aquinas, and in the
same paragraph §43 he contrasts Werk (opus) to Wirkung (effectus),
aligning the artist’s Produkt with the former terms, and the honey-
comb with the latter.
Against the thesis that the work is simply the artist’s product or
effect, it can be argued that some of the identifying or essential fea-
tures of the work involve the artist’s activities, and more specifically,
aspects of the process whereby the artefact or event was generated. It
will not do to try to explain this by saying that reference to the arte-
fact’s relations to the agent’s actions is purely epistemic, or in other
words, merely our (optional) way of experiencing or thinking about
the product. A work, we say, is skillful or inept to some degree, and
a judgement of this sort does not refer uniquely to the intrinsic prop-
erties of a physical object or artefact, but instead bears upon a relation
obtaining between the content and quality of the artist’s intention
and the actual results of the actions the artist undertakes in an
effort to realize those intentions. A skill is a capacity to succeed in at-
tempts at doing something difficult; to say that a product is skillful is
to imply that the action whereby it was made was the activation of
such an ability. An inept yet lucky attempt is contrasted, then, to a
skillful action in which the agent realizes the aim as intended.
11 Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der Urteilskraft. Kants gesammelte
Schriften, Vol. 5. (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1902 [1790]), paragraph 43;
Guyer, Paul and Matthews, Eric (trans.), Guyer, Paul (ed.), Critique of the
Power of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),182.
For a discussion of Kant’s definition of art and its relation to some more
recent views, see Guyer, Paul, ‘From Jupiter’s Eagle to Warhol’s Boxes:
The Concept of Art from Kant to Danto’, Philosophical Studies 25:1
(1997), 83–116.
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What, then, is the link between skill and artistic value? Here we
must be very careful, since the bold and straightforward theses on
this topic are false. The successful realization of some artistic inten-
tion cannot alone suffice to endowaworkwith a corresponding artistic
merit, since the intended feature can be artistically worthless. And if
there can be valuable, but unintended artistic properties, as I thinkwe
should recognize, intention is not necessary to artistic value either. So
we have to look for more subtle correlations.
One possibility is that the intentional realization of an intended goal
could contribute to artistic value in a context where other conditions
(including conditions on the quality of the intention) are satisfied. As
I have already implied, we should acknowledge the existence of artis-
tic serendipity, which is what happens when the artist goes looking
for one sort of good thing, does not find it, but luckily comes up
with some other kind of good thing. Even if we grant the existence
of artistic serendipity, perhaps the successful realization of at least
some artistic intentions is necessary to the creation of any work of
art having significant artistic value. This weaker necessity thesis
can be tested by asking whether there is or could be a highly valuable
work of art, all of the significant artistic merits of which were the un-
intended consequences of the artist’s inept attempts to endow the
work with artistic qualities vastly different from those it actually pos-
sesses. I do not know of any such cases and think that such a thing is
highly unlikely, but perhaps this is merely the product ofmy inability
to imagine the glories of a totally serendipitous work, that is, one in
which all of the mediocre features conceived of and attempted by
the inept artist were luckily supplanted by marvelous artistic
qualities.
There is another way to support a thesis to the effect that whether
an artistically valenced property has been intentionally realized can
make a difference to some of the work’s artistic values, and hence
ought to be recognized as potentially contributing, in more or less
direct ways, to the overall artistic merit (or demerit) of the work.
Such a thesis can be supported by reference to a sub-category of valu-
able artistic properties which can only be realized when the artist’s in-
tentions match the subsequent output. An example of properties
falling into such a category is a stylistic feature the value of which
necessarily pertains to themanner in which the artist designs and exe-
cutes that feature in the making of the work.12 An artistic feature
12 ‘Style’ and ‘stylistic’ are, of course, amongst the most contested and
ambiguous terms in aesthetic discourse. On one usage, these terms are em-
ployed to refer to the manner or mode involved in some feature or collection
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referred to as ‘semi-archaic’ is an example of an artistic property be-
longing to that category, as it is a property that is only valuable when
intentionally realized (as when an artist, such as Sassetta, chooses to
combine rival or seemingly incompatible options or features in a par-
ticular historical situation). If features of a work are semi-archaic by
design, then these features carry one artistic valence, but if they are
merely the result of ineptitude or happenstance, they carry another,
negative valence.
Such considerations concerning one aspect of artistic value and its
appreciation support the idea that the process/product ambiguity at
the heart of the concept of a work should be maintained. A work,
then, should be conceived of as comprised of a result as well as an in-
tentional activity converging on that result. With this in mind, the
work of art as a whole should be distinguished from the product
alone, or what can be called the artistic vehicle, such as a painted
surface, a string of linguistic symbols, a sequence of sounds, bodily
movements, or whatever other perceptible or cognizable arrangement
may be put on display for some audience to contemplate.
In employing the term artistic ‘vehicle’ here, I follow a usage
adopted, for example, by H. S. Goodhart-Rendel in 1934, as well
as by such philosophers as Stephen C. Pepper and C. I. Lewis, and
a few contemporary figures, including David Davies.13 In old-
fashioned medicinal parlance, the vehicle is the sugar that makes
the medicine go down; those who dislike the medical and other con-
notations of thewordmay prefer to follow Jerrold Levinson, Gregory
Currie and others in speaking of artistic ‘structures’.14With regard to
the cinema, it is appropriate to use the term ‘audio-visual display’ to
refer to the vehicle or structure of a cinematic work, though it may be
worth noting thatmany film scholars think there are cinematic ‘texts’,
probably because they have inmind the Barthesian idea of un texte (or
even du texte) as anything it can be amusing to interpret. Or perhaps
of features of a work or works; cf. Prown, Jules David, ‘Style as Evidence’,
Winterthur Portfolio 15:3 (1980), 197–210.
13 Goodhart-Rendel, H. S., Fine Art (Oxford: Clarendon, 1934), 3–4,
Pepper, Stephen C., ‘The Individuality of a Work of Art’, University of
California Publications in Philosophy 20 (1937), 81–97, The Basis of
Criticism in the Arts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945),
The Work of Art (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955), Davies,
David, Art as Performance (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004).
14 Levinson, Jerrold ,Music, Art, andMetaphysics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1990), Currie, Gregory, An Ontology of Art (London:
Macmillan, 1989).
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what leads film scholars to refer to moving images as texts is some
more general (and in my view dubious) ‘semiotic’ notion that any-
thing that is meaningful or has content is a text.
One key reason for insisting on awork/vehicle distinction (which is
different from the distinction between a work and its multiple in-
stances) is this: a work of art is more than the perceptible item (or
type of item) an artist may intentionally put on display, since the
work includes relations between that item and relevant aspects of
the artist’s activity and attitudes, including intentions, decisions,
and a way of devising, making, classifying, and displaying the
vehicle or structure. In those happy cases where the intended proper-
ties of a work have been realized as intended, this is not an intrinsic
feature of the vehicle, but it is a feature of the work. The overall expli-
cation of the concept named ‘work of art’ that best accommodates
these points is our third, ‘skill-inclusive’ option, which identifies
the work as a process/product relation.
Is this a revisionary proposal? If ‘revisionary’ means anything that
deviates from a literal acceptance of all ordinary usage, the answer is
‘yes’, since one of the proposal’s entailments is that what is located in
the box at the Louvre is the artistic vehicle (the poplar board), not the
work of art. But is revisionism necessarily a bad thing? It is common
sense, and not at all revisionist, to observe that revisionism would
only be amistake if we knew that the status quo could not be improved.
That is usually quite hard to establish, however, especially when it
comes to the vagaries of ordinary usage. Philosophers of art would
do well, I think, to look beyond the revisionary/non-revisionary di-
chotomy (and what may or may not be a Strawson-inspired appeal
to a ‘descriptive’ metaphysics).
In any case, the broad approach to the conception of works that I
have just sketched does not lack distinguished historical antecedents
as well as the sophisticated 20th-century proponents mentioned
above. For example, when Leon Battista Alberti attempted to gener-
alize about excellence in architecture, or what he called ‘concinnitas’,
one of his concerns was to characterize ‘lineamentis’, which can be
translated, at least if we follow Bastoli, whowas responsible for bring-
ing Alberti’s Latin into the vernacular, as ‘disegno’ or ‘design’.15




L’architettura (De re aedificatoria) di Leon Battista Alberti trodotta in
lingua fiorentina da Cosimo Bartoli. . . con l’aggiunta de disegni (Florence:
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Design in turn is understood as ‘a product of human ingenuity’
(ingenio), but also as a project [une preordinazione] ‘executed with
learned ingenuity, intelligence, and talent [‘animo ingenio et
erudito’ for which Bastoli wrote ‘condotto da anima e da ingegnio
buono’]. Such was Alberti’s general characterization of one of the
privileged objects of appreciation. More generally, skill and inten-
tion-related properties, such as design, figure amongst the objects
of artistic appreciation, and we should only accept an account of
works that is consistent with this assumption.
In order to make this point and some of its implications more tan-
gible, in the next section of this paper I discuss a particular example.
This discussion will set the stage for a return to the theoretical issues
in the final section of the paper.
II
My example belongs to an important category of cinematic works in
which the relation to a literary or other anterior work invites and
guides specific comparisons that are meant to inform both the experi-
ence and appreciation of the work. I have in mind the category of
cinematic adaptations, for to appreciate an adaptation as such is to
weigh the qualitative differences and similarities between the adap-
tation and the work that served as its source or model.16 Cinematic
adaptations belong, I propose, to the larger category of overtly imita-
tive works, that is, works explicitly or conspicuously modelled on
anterior works, and where the target audience is meant to be aware
of this modeling relation. In some cases, such as in a pastiche or a
Lorenzo Torrentino, 1550); Alberti, Leon Batista, On the Art of Building in
Ten Books, Rykwert, Joseph, Leach, Neil, and Tavernor, Robert (trans.)
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 7. I am aware that there is a tendency
in the literature on Alberti to stress the neo-Platonic assumptions in his aes-
thetics, and there is a good basis for this in his remarks on beauty. See, for
example, Gadol, Joan, Leon Battista Alberti: Universal Man of the Early
Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). Yet the rather
non-Platonic, positive emphasis on the artist’s ingenuity is an element in
the text to which many of Alberti’s translators and commentators have
also been attuned.
16 For background to this remark, see my ‘On the Appreciation of
Cinematic Adaptations’, Projections 4:2 (2010), 104–127. I am grateful to
Trevor Ponech for valuable collaboration on the topic of cinematic
adaptations.
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parody, the source is not a particular, identifiablework, but a category
or style of works, such as westerns or science fiction or the distinctive
life-work of a famous author. In other cases, an overtly imitativework
is conspicuously based on a particular model, and the audience of the
adaptation is expected to entertain comparisons between the adap-
tation and its model so as to grasp various aspects of the adaptation’s
intentional design. Whereas some imitative works of this sort are de-
signed to remain highly faithful to the model, others are not, and
instead exhibit creative differences from that model while also re-
maining overtly imitative in other respects. In some cases it is a
matter of a transgressive manifestation of the distance from the
anterior model, but in other cases there is a more or less harmonious
combination of imitative and innovative traits.
Consider now the 2004 cinematic adaptation of Thackeray’sVanity
Fair. This is a very fine instance of the hybrid category referred to
above. For those who know something about the filmmakers and
the novel, it is easy to observe that this is not an adaptation the
makers of which slavishly sought a high degree of fidelity to the
source, yet as it is an adaptation, the work was of course meant to
carry over a number of key features (or more accurately, types of fea-
tures) of that source. In both the film and the novel, the central char-
acter is a parvenue or social climber named ‘Rebecca Sharp’. In the
novel Becky is a deeply villainous figure, a mother who intentionally
and systematically mistreats her child. Yet in the film, the homon-
ymous character is a rather more sympathetic figure, not simply
one portrait figuring alongside the others in a very long gallery of
vaniteux.
Plenty of evidence supports this broad contrast. In interviews in
which she discusses the approach adopted in the making of the
film, the director and co-author of the script, Mira Nair, admits
that her Becky is a ‘rascal’, but repeatedly praises the character’s in-
telligence, artistic talent, and selfless acts of friendship. One finds
little or no evidence of any such selfless acts in the novel. The subtitle
of Thackery’s work is ‘a novel without a hero’, but Nair and her mul-
tiple collaborators have not made a film without a heroine. Money,
and those who have it, such as Lord Steyne, are the real problem in
the film’s story, not the efforts and schemes of those who, like
Rebecca and her artist father, are bornwith talent but withoutmoney.
To develop these points in a bit more detail, let us consider how the
movie-makers have rather cleverly adapted the episode in which
Becky has managed to get herself invited to the home of the lecherous
Lord Steyne. This is already something of an achievement for the
social climber, but Rebecca still faces the problem of getting the
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aristocratic women to stop ‘cutting’ her. Taking pity on her, and
perhaps in an effort to placate her husband, Lady Steyne finally
asks Rebeccawhether shewill sing. Here is what Thackeray’s narrator
tells us about what happens next:
‘I will do anything that may give pleasure to my Lord Steyne or
to you’, said Rebecca, sincerely grateful, and seating herself at the
piano, began to sing.
She sang religious songs ofMozart, which had been early favour-
ites of Lady Steyne, and with such sweetness and tenderness that
the lady lingering round the piano, sate down by its side, and lis-
tened until the tears rolled down her eyes.17
The treatment given to this material in the film is quite novel and
nothing short of marvelous. Film-making is often a richly collabora-
tive endeavor, and the scene in question is a good case where cine-
matic genius is a matter of the harmonious contributions made by a
group of creative people. Nair deserves authorial credit for having
skillfully solicited and orchestrated contributions from a variety of ta-
lented people, including Julian Fellowes, who co-authored the script
with Nair; Beatrix Aruna Pasztor, who was responsible for the
costume design; Allyson Johnson, the editor, and Declan Quinn,
cinematographer.
With regard to the artistic brilliance of the scene in question,
special mention should be made of the Canadian composer
Mychael Danna, who provided an inventive and lovely musical
setting to Tennyson’s poem, gorgeously sung by Custer Larue. In
this regard, the adaptation explicitly diverges not only from the nove-
listic source but from the historical record. When Lady Steyne asks
Becky what song to play, she names Tennyson’s poem, as though
the music that follows were some well-known composition. This is
clearly a deliberate anachronism, yet inmy view it has a cogent artistic
motivation in the context of a hybrid adaptation aimed at a deliberate
refashioning of the parvenue. Nair and her collaborators did well in
deliberately swerving away fromhaving themovie’s Rebecca hypocri-
tically lend her voice to a rendition of ‘OGottes Lamm’, or one of the
17 Thackeray, William Makepeace Thackeray, Vanity Fair: A Novel
without a Hero, Tillotson, Geoffrey and Kathleen (eds.) (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin & Co., Riverside Edition, 1963), 474. For those using
other editions, the passage is to be found at the end of chapter 49. In the
novel, Becky’s singing does not win over the other ladies, who keep up a
‘loud and ceaseless buzzing and talking’. Here there can be no reasonable
doubt that the filmmakers intentionally diverged from the novelistic source.
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other relatively obscure religious songs by Mozart. Instead, Nair’s
Rebecca honestly wins her audience, just as Nair courts hers, with
the beauty and power of a song of erotic mystery and intimacy. In
Thackeray, Becky manages to charm Lady Steyne largely because
she stirs up the Lady’s childhood associations; Becky fails,
however, to charm the other women. In the film, Becky seduces
everyone who witnesses her performance. In Thackeray, Rebecca’s
oft-mentioned musical talent is adduced as another illustration of a
moralist’s contrast between an all-too-scarce moral virtue, on the
one hand, and beauty, talent, and the other worldly vanities on the
other. In the film there is instead a harmonious celebration of artistic
virtuosity exemplified by Becky’s adept performance of a fascinating
song.
While the cinematic medium has its own specific artistic tech-
niques, films can also nest or embed the expressive devices of many
other art forms, such as, most obviously, music, dance, and
costume, but also, interior design and the statues and pictures that
are depicted within a set. A film can also nest within itself another
work of art. Very briefly, a work nests another work when at least
part of the vehicle of that work is observable in the vehicle of the
nesting or matrix work.18 For example, the words of Tennyson’s
poem are audible in Becky’s song. In a sense, the specifically cine-
matic genius of this scene is its very combination of an array of
nested artistic vehicles.
A systematic analysis of the scene, and of its relation to thework as a
whole, would take quite some time, and in what follows I single out
only a few aspects. At the beginning of the scene, Becky enters a
roomful of enemies. Her social exclusion is visually highlighted by
the contrast between her black dress and the white and red gowns
worn by the others. An overhead crane shot shows how Becky quite
literally attempts to break into the closed circle of thewomen gathered
about a round table, looking at drawings. When Becky approaches,
the others flee in a kind of choreography of social exclusion. As
Becky begins to sing, Nair and her team draw masterfully upon
two of the most powerful cinematic devices: close-ups and reaction
shots. The fictional performance of Becky is a composite of the ac-
tresses’ expressive mimicry and the singer’s dubbed-in voice. Shots
of the actress pretending to sing are intercut with shots that depict
18 For background and amore detailed explication, seemy ‘Nested Art’,
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61:3 (2003), 233–245, and
‘Artistic Nesting in The Five Obstructions’, in Hjort, Mette (ed.), On The
Five Obstructions (London: Wallflower Press, 2008), 57–75.
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the responses of the onlookers, whose faces progressively shift from
cool disdain to a reluctant acknowledgement of talent, and finally
to complicity and genuine aesthetic delight. Whatever else they
make think of her, the audience must acknowledge and admire
Becky’s talent.
A few comments on the use of lip-synching in this scene may be in
order. In a purely musical context, the use of this device is hardly an
artistic virtue, yet the valence somehow shifts in the context of Nair’s
film, where no deception is involved. We can admire Reece
Witherspoon’s skill, not at singing, but at pretending to sing, just
as we can admire the director’s selection of a superior voice for the
part; Witherspoon is a performer in the work as opposed to one of
the work’s authors, so there is no reason to conclude that she ought
to have sung the part herself, or that her failure to sing is a flaw in
her performance. Finally, we may note that in her commentary on
the film, the director has generously identified a cinematic source
that provided some inspiration for the scene, Bollywood director
Guru Dutt’s 1957 film, Pyaasa. It is true that both films include
lip-synched song sequences in which a singing figure interacts dyna-
mically with a crowd of onlookers, but the one inDutt’s film lacks the
restraint, precision, and elegance of Nair’s scene.19
Some readers may wonder what my points about adaptations have
to do with the distinction between the work and its vehicle and with
the considerations introduced above about works as product and
process. An answer to that question can be formulated by turning
our backs on the messiness of actual artistic examples and referring
to a schematic, imaginary example devised in the manner of Jorge
Luis Borges’ oft-mined 1939 story of Pierre Menard.20
Imagine, then, that two film-makers (or teams thereof), A1 and
A2, work independently. Rather surprisingly, they somehow end
upmaking cinematic displays (or ‘texts’ if you insist) that are indistin-
guishable.21 Call these Vehicle 1 andVehicle 2 ofWork 1 andWork 2,
19 Readers are invited to compare the song sequences, which are avail-
able at http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=GeqU0maaQL0 and http://
www.youtube.com/ watch?v=wFQc6PyAf5I (accessed 28.9.2011).
20 To my knowledge, the first argumentative use of this source in
English in the context of aesthetics was Anthony Savile’s, ‘Nelson
Goodman’s “Languages of Art”: A Study’, The British Journal of
Aesthetics 11:1 (1971), 3–27. For other references, see ‘History of the
Ontology of Art’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011); http://
plato.stanford. edu/entries/art-ontology-history/.
21 By ‘indistinguishable’ I mean competent or normal observers cannot
perceive any intrinsic differences between the two items and so would
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made by A1 and A2, respectively. Both vehicles bear a number of
striking resemblances to a particular novel, N, published prior to
their making. The author of Work 1 intentionally based his film on
N, conceiving of the film rather standardly as a cinematic adaptation
of this particular, anterior work. Yet the author of Work 2 was
blithely unaware of N, and so in creating his film was in no way
intent upon making an adaptation of it. Nor was A2 basing his
work on other works that were modeled on, or direct sources for
N. One might conclude, on the basis of the resemblances between
N andWork 2, that the latter lacks historical if not psychological crea-
tivity: even though A2 was innocent of copying N, ‘somebody else
got there first’, and the film therefore lacks one kind of novelty. In
such a context, it would, however, be a blunder to classify Work 2
as an adaptation. So as we scrutinize the qualities of Vehicle 2, it
would be an error to think in terms of the ways in which the
maker(s) intentionally copied or diverged fromN, whereas the track-
ing of these very same sorts of qualities would be wholly appropriate
in an assessment of Work 1, which cries out to be understood in
relation to its source as well as to its maker’s particular manner of un-
derstanding (or misunderstanding) that source. It follows, then, that
while the vehicles are type-identical, the works are not, and from this
fact, given some relatively uncontroversial assumptions about iden-
tity, it follows that the works are not identical to their vehicles.
Instead, the work is the relation between a vehicle and the episode
of its making, or the product as well as the process. To appreciate a
work, as opposed to the vehicle alone, one must know certain
things about the artist’s intentions and decisions, as well as about
the features of the historical context within which the artist was
acting.22
classify them accurately as tokens of the same type of audio-visual display. If
these observers had no independent knowledgewhether they were experien-
cing a screening of Vehicle 1 or Vehicle 2, they would, after a particular
screening, have a 50% chance of correctly identifying which one they had
just seen. For the sake of the argument, I stipulate that the credits in
Vehicle 1 make no reference to the novelistic source, perhaps because it
was deemed too obvious to require mention. This makes A2′s ignorance
of N a glaring weakness, but that only reinforces the point about the artistic
differences between Work 1 and Work 2.
22 Thismore general thesis was, of course, argued for in amore eloquent
and less roundaboutway by Erwin Panofsky in his essay, ‘TheHistory of Art
as a Humanistic Discipline’, in Greene, T. M. (ed.), The Meaning of the
Humanities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), 89–118. The
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It follows from these remarks that the successful appreciation of an
adaptation requires a lot of knowledge, not only about the features of
the source, but about how that source has been understood by the
makers of the adaptation. The appreciator also needs to know
which of the source’s features the adaptors do and do not intend to
carry over into the adaptation. Appreciation is a fallible enterprise:
of course the appreciator may lack some of this knowledge, and the
available evidence may require careful sifting.
Here, for example, is a tangle related to the Thackeray example.
One of my central claims above about the relation between Nair’s
and Thackeray’s works is that Becky in the novel is a far more villai-
nous character than the Becky in the film. Yet Nair’s co-author of the
script, Julian Fellowes, has denied that in the novel Becky is really a
villainess. Thackeray, he claims, ‘had to pretend’ that Becky was not
the heroine.23 I confess that I do not find it cogent to conjecture that
whenThackeray wrote in away that coherently invites us to imagine a
character who does a lot of obviously evil things, hewas only pretend-
ing to do so, and ‘thus’ the character does not really do these evil
things in the story. The list of Becky’s misdeeds in the story is quite
long, and the only way to delete or shorten that list would be to
argue that the narrator is lying or otherwise unreliable. The author,
then, would only be pretending to endorse everything the narrator
says about what happens in the story, but the discerning reader
would detect the irony and suspend the make-believe. Yet I see no
evidence to support the postulation in Thackeray’s Vanity Fair of
an authorial irony with regard to the descriptions of the story
events that are proffered by the seemingly omniscient narrator.
Thackeray very obviously uses the device of the unreliable narrator
in the case of the first-person account in Barry Lyndon (Barry is
more villainous than he presents himself as being) but there is no
such first-person narration at work in Vanity Fair. Even if Nair
et al. genuinely intended to be faithful to Thackeray’s intentions by
making Rebecca a positive heroine, and even were we to grant the
greatest (unintended) achievement of post-structuralist art theory was prod-
ding analytic philosophers into developing increasingly elaborate justifica-
tions of traditional humanistic positions.
23 See his remarks as cited in Muir, John Kenneth,Mercy in Her Eyes:
The Films of Mira Nair (New York: Applause Theater and Cinema Books,
2006), 220–223. Like all statements about artistic intentions, this is one is
fallible, both as a characterization of Fellowes’ effective intentions, but
also as a description of the overarching intentions behind the making of
the film as a whole.
99
On Cinematic Genius: Ontology and Appreciation
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1358246112000215
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 17:17:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
accuracy of Fellowes’ claim about the conjectured unreliable narra-
tion or authorial pretense in the novel, the film could not have been
genuinely faithful to the novel in realizing such an intention
because Thackeray’s putative ironic or indirect strategy of character-
ization would have been left behind. It is far from apparent, in any
case, that the film as a whole was actually designed with this sort of
fidelity in mind, and thus I am reluctant to ascribe to its makers a
failure in attempting to achieve any such thing. Instead, the more
straightforward conclusion is that while Thackeray’s book has no
heroine, Nair’s film does. Nair’s Becky is a talented parvenue whose
tough circumstances explain the liberties she takes with what is pre-
sented as a conventional and largely hypocritical set of imperial
mores.
III
With the discussion of the example in mind we can identify some of
the kinds of artistic properties that are the object of one important
species of artistic appreciation; for shorthand, I refer to these proper-
ties as pertaining to artistry, understood, following Alberti, as ta-
lented and intelligent choice and skilful purposeful activity in the
realization of an artistic design. The appreciation of artistry, I have
suggested, requires attunement to the artist’s actions and choices in
a context.
To return to the ontological issues broached earlier, the questions
to which we must address ourselves are these: what kind of item is it
that can be the bearer of the properties involved in artistry? What
kinds of entities are they, and are they multiple or singular?
To begin with the distinction between the work of art and the ar-
tistic vehicle, it is generally allowed that in the case of film, the artistic
vehicle is not a unique object, but a type of text or display. Two
people can experience two distinct tokens of the same type of
audio-visual display at the same time but in different places. This
is the case because various technologies can be used to encode a
type of display that is then instantiated in particular screenings or
projections effectuated by the relevant machines. As Noël Carroll
has observed, such a screening is not like the performance of a
musical or theatrical work, as normally no artistry is involved in
such mechanical operations as using a projector to screen a film.24
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Or in other words, the projectionist’s performance, while valuable
and important, is not one of the objects of artistic appreciation.
Mention should, however, be made, in passing, of hybrid traditions
in which musical and other performances enhanced screenings of
films. For example, in Japan, kowairo setsumei (translated literally
as ‘voice colouring’) was provided by a group of performers who,
seated out of sight, improvised dialogue during the screening of a
‘silent’ film.
Setting aside various hard questions about the nature of cinematic
vehicles, I turn now to the question of the relation between the vehicle
and the work. What, finally, is a work if it is not the discrete and de-
tachable product of the artist’s creative activity? The crux is to say
something sufficiently accurate and informative about the nature of
the complex, relational entity which is a work of art, and there
remains significant disagreement amongst philosophers on this
score, including those who agree that the work is a relation between
a structure or vehicle and an artist’s (or artists’) attitudes and creative
activities in a context.
A good part of this disagreement hinges on the right way to provide
a highly general characterization of the action artists undertake in
relation to the vehicle of a work.25 The traditional inclination is to
invoke some concept of creation or making, understood broadly as
being instrumental in and responsible for intentionally bringing
something into existence for the first time. Yet objections to this tra-
ditional idea have been raised. If the vehicle is an abstract type or a
universal, it is reasoned, this item cannot have been literally created
as a result of the activities of a spatio-temporally located agent.
This assumption, which may not be well-founded, is what motivates
some philosophers to say that the artist discovers or indicates an artistic
structure, but does not genuinely create one. My view is that it is pre-
ferable for a variety of reasons to say that the artist intentionally
creates, makes, or chooses a primary instance or token of the
vehicle; the artist makes various choices regarding the primary
token’s features and this vehicle’s possible and appropriate reproduc-
tions. As appreciators of works, we are interested in the difference
made by the artist’s purposeful and potentially skillful manipulation
of artistic media, and talk of a rather cerebral ‘discovery’ of pre-exist-
ing abstracta does not correspond to the object of this sort of well-en-
trenched interest. Also, if we remember that in some art forms, such
25 For an informative discussion of this issue, see Nussbaum, Charles,
‘Kinds, Types, and Musical Ontology’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 61:3 (2003), 273–291.
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as dance and mime, the vehicle is itself a matter of physical actions
and gestures (as opposed, say, to the making of some artefact or ar-
rangement of objects), it is especially awkward to have to say, as
some philosophers would have us say, that the artist’s role in the pro-
duction of a work of art is to discover or select a type of movement or
action that is the artistic structure. Instead, it is preferable to say that
the artist creates a work by performing intentional actions, where
some of these actions generate or constitute or otherwise give rise to
a first, and in some cases, the only instance of the perceptible
vehicle of the work.
With regard to cinematic works, while it may appeal to some phi-
losophers to imagine that all possible types of audio-visual displays
‘always already’ exist along with all other abstract items, it seems un-
helpful and irrelevant at best, and ludicrous at worst, to think that
what the film-makers are doing in their painstaking labours in
those ‘fields of technology’ that are the film set and film studio is to
‘indicate’ or ‘discover’ a pre-existent audio-visual display. Did Nair
and her collaborators merely discover the audio-visual images of
the heavily costumed Reece Witherspoon et al. as they prepared
and then filmed the ‘Crimson Petal’ scene, or did they not substan-
tially create this part of the multiply instantiable artistic vehicle of
the work they were inventing? And is this skillful act of creation
not one of the key bearers of the kind of value that is necessary to
what we recognize as the artistic merit of the work?
As I have just implied and do not tire of repeating, the vehicle is not
equivalent to the work. Nor is it accurate to say that the vehicle is an
instance of the work, though the temptation to employ such a confus-
ing locution persists. The vehicle of a work does not fully manifest or
constitute that work; the vehicle conveys some of the work’s features,
but it does not carry all of them, as some of thework’s features pertain
to attitudes and actions that are not, strictly speaking, intrinsic prop-
erties of an artistic vehicle.
As has often been observed in the literature, this approach to the
nature of works does some violence to ordinary language, since we
regularly say we see and hear the film, by which we mean the cine-
matic work, whereas we cannot literally see and hear the work if it
is not only an audio-visual display, but the determination of that
display as the vehicle of a particular finished work by this (individual
or collective) author. But I do not see why this kind of linguistic con-
sideration should be decisive if we are doing philosophy, which
should not be a matter of always speaking roughly and efficiently,
but of trying, within the limits appropriate to the subject matter, of
saying something reasonably precise, sometimes at the cost of
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elegance and discursive economy (the current sentence being a very
good example). And the proposed approach to art’s ontology and
appreciation is, I maintain, firmly anchored in well-entrenched artis-
tic practices that have a solid motivation in our perennial interest in
certain forms of agent-related artistic value.
I shall concludewith a few remarks about the bedeviled topic of the
multiple or singular nature of the work of art and/or artistic vehicle.
This topic is not, I believe, reducible to a single question. One can,
for example, ask, of any given artistic vehicle, whether it admits of
an artistically perfect reproduction; it is another question to ask
whether the work of art, of which this item is the vehicle, is a
unique entity or something admitting multiple instances or occur-
rences. So one sort of question is about vehicles, as in: can the
vehicle of the Mona Lisa be adequately reproduced? Or could there
be two distinct yet artistically equivalent performances of the
Hammerklavier sonata? Another sort of question, which is not a
matter of questions about artistic vehicles, is about works, as in:
could there be two Hammerklavier sonatas? Not two performances
of that work, but two compositions referred to by that name? If we
follow Currie in thinking that the work that bears this title is in fact
an action type, it follows that there could be two or more tokens or in-
stances of this type.
A good part of the disagreement on such difficult questions arises
from philosophers’ divergence with regard to the nature of the
modality that is deemed decisive in saying whether a given artistic
entity is multiple or singular. For example, since he reasons in
terms of logical possibility, C. I. Lewis deems all artistic vehicles to
be multiple, even if the current techniques of reproduction are
highly imperfect. Similarly, Currie reasons that a work of art is an
action type because it is metaphysically possible for more than one ar-
tistically equivalent event to take place in contexts where all artisti-
cally relevant factors are equivalent. For Currie the event is a
certain type of discovering of something in a certain type of
context, and since the event and its components are not numerical
individuals, but schematic types, the work logically admits of mul-
tiple instances. Yet someone who is interested in the value of specific
artistic accomplishments could agree with these observations as a
matter of logic and metaphysics, yet argue that this is not the sort
of possibility that is most relevant to our appreciation of the artistic
value and status of a work. If we think in terms, not of what is logi-
cally or metaphysically possible, but in terms of what is probable
given the history of the arts in our world, the singular nature of the
artist’s achievement in a particular context comes to the fore. It is
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logically possible, of course, that a twin Nair created a twin Vanity
Fair based on a twin Thackeray novel on a planet that is a perfect
image of our own. Perhaps such a strange event is also nomologically
possible, since given what we think we know about the laws of
physics, no law of nature would have to be violated for this to take
place. Yet even if this much is allowed, it may be rejoined that this
is an extremely unlikely event that in no way figures within the
scope of our artistic appreciation. Nair’s work is to be appreciated
only in relation to the context and tradition in which her relation to
Thackeray emerged, for it is in this context that she and her collabor-
ators have found an interesting response to the challenge of adap-
tation, a response involving both the following and breaking of the
rules of fidelity to a prized literary source.26
Lingnan University
pl@ln.edu.hk
26 Versions of this paper were presented at the Royal Institute of
Philosophy and at the University of Kent, Canterbury, and I am grateful
to members of the audience for their questions and comments. Thanks
are due as well to Rafael De Clercq and Kelly Trogdon for criticisms of a
draft of the paper. This research has benefited from financial support
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